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Abstract  
 
This study examines the relationship between the quality of financial information disclosed and governance 
mechanisms on certain features of the board, ownership structure and control system for French companies listed on 
the SBF 250 for a period of five years from 2004 to 2008. The quality of financial information is approximated by the 
discretionary accruals and with a disclosure index with 78 items. The result shows a positive effect of certain variables 
such as the size of the board of directors, the members' attendance at Board meetings and the presence of the Big 4 
and the presence of a dual listing. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The beginning of the first decade of the 21st century was marked by several scandals, fraud and manipulating all kinds of 
information. Scandals are established in the presence of misdeeds committed by director belonging to the large 
companies and normally supposed to be trustworthy person. These executives cannot effectively use or divert funds and 
overestimate the value of assets with the cooperation of officials in other companies or subsidiaries. 
These poor practices are considered an evidence of the failure of current models of corporate governance, and the 
presence of risk of disclosure lack. These scandals renewed debates about the relative merits of the accounting 
principles adopted in the United States and led to the introduction of new laws. 
A company must provide to its shareholders, regulators and markets through the annual reports financial 
information with higher quality. It is a necessary factor for good governance. Thus, the disclosure is closely linked to the 
practice of good corporate governance. Improving corporate governance is considered among the themes that have 
attracted the attention of researchers in finance and since the scandals that took place in the early 2000s (Gaint et al, 
2009). 
The traditional literature on corporate governance has proposed a solution to the problems of control by 
implementing of incentive contracts. These were supposed to solve the problems concerning the cost of access to perfect 
information and the incapacity of shareholders to deal correctly information. Incentive mechanisms seek to achieve a 
concordance between the interests of the manager and shareholders. Since the 1990s the solution to the problem of 
information asymmetry appears to be supported by the disclosure of financial information (Gainet et al., 2009). Voluntary 
or mandatory disclosure would have the merit to reduce information asymmetries and enable effective monitoring of 
management, and thereby establish good governance. Managers tend to provide voluntary disclosures to make investors 
aware of their ability to manage and avoid mispricing of their actions and performance. They are likely to provide 
voluntary disclosures and forecasts to show to investors that they are interested in the evolution of the economic 
environment in which the company operates and they are able to respond quickly to changes (Gaint et al., 2009).This is a 
positive signal to investors about the abilities of managers, and has a positive effect on stock returns and on the market 
value of the firm (La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 2000). Information disclosed should have certain 
quality. It must be reliable and relevant to help users and stakeholders in the decision making. For this reason, it is 
necessary to detect the determinants of the quality of information disclosed. The theoretical arguments that justified the 
selection of the determinants of financial disclosure are the presence of agency costs, properties cost, political cost, 
litigation cost and signal theory (Healy and paleplu, 2001; Watson, Shrives and Marston, 2002). 
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 It is generally accepted that certain characteristics of the company have an impact on the level and the quality of 
financial information disclosed. However, what firm-specific characteristic is supposed to influence the level and the 
quality of financial information disclosed? 
Several variables concerning profitability and market structure can explain the firm behavior to disclose voluntarily 
financial information such as firm size, leverage, profitability, size of audit firm, and the status of listing (Barako et al. 
2006; Chavent et al, 2006; Ho and Taylor, 2007 Cheung, 2010 ). 
The second category of factors that affect the quality of financial disclosure incorporates the features of corporate 
governance (Bushman, Piotroski and Smith, 2004). This study seeks to provide possible determinants of the extent of 
corporate disclosure for French listed companies.  These determinants precisely concern corporate governance 
variables. To assess the quality of financial information disclosed, various measurement methods were used. For this 
study, the first measure is the abnormal accruals estimated by the model of Shahrur and Raman (2008). According to 
Francis et al, (2005), a high level of abnormal accruals implies low quality of accounting income and increases the level of 
risk among investors. The second measure used is the construction of an unweighted disclosure index composed by 78 
items. 
The rest of this study will be presented as follows: the second section examines the presentation of literature on 
the disclosure quality determinants, section three presents the model and the sample, the fourth section discusses the 
interpretation and analysis of results. At last, fifth section provides the conclusion of study. 
 
2. Literature review 
 
Among determinants of the level and the quality of financial information disclosed there are firm-specific factors and 
factors related to mechanism governance. 
The variables explanatory disclosure quality about firm characteristics can be grouped into three groups.  The 
variables related to the structure, performance and market (Lang and Lundholm, 1993; Leventis and Weetman, 2004). 
The variables considered in our study are leverage, profitability, listing status and industry. The literature has also shown 
that the quality of financial information disclosed is affected by the mechanisms of corporate governance on the 
characteristics of the board, on the ownership structure and on effective control. Corporate governance factors may 
encourage firm to disclosure more financial information. The effectiveness of these mechanisms is reflected by good 
corporate governance system. 
 
2.1. The characteristics of the firm 
 
2.1.1. Leverage 
 
According to the agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), a company with a higher debt ratio has an incentive to 
disclose more information. Creditors can protect themselves by restrictive covenants in debt. Managers have incentives 
to increase disclosure to reduce agency costs. Disclosure of financial information reduces agency costs and facilitates to 
creditors the risk assessment of the company (Botosan and Plumlee, 2002). Creditors likely ask more information to 
ensure their funds. From these explanations, we anticipate that the relationship between the quality of disclosure of 
financial information and leverage is positive. 
 
2.1.2. The profitability 
 
The signaling theory suggests that if a company is profitable, it could disclose more information to indicate the credibility 
of its reported earnings, to increase its reputation and to avoid undervaluation of its equity (Inchausti 1997).The 
profitability of the company shows information that may be interest to users of financial information. (Wallace, Naser, and 
Mora, 1994). It is generally argued that the manager of the most profitable companies disclose more financial information 
to signaling and adverse selection incentives (Verrecchia, 1983, Lang and Lundholm, 1993). Firms tend to communicate 
more frequently information when the result is positive (Akhtaruddin , 2005).Managers have incentives to disclose 
information in order to reduce of legal liability (Lang and Lundholm, 1993;  Ho and Taylor, 2007). These arguments lead 
us to predict a positive relationship between profitability and financial disclosure. 
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2.1.3 The industry 
 
Membership in a particular industry can be considered as an explanatory factor for the disclosure of financial information. 
(Leventis and Weetman, 2004). For example, manufacturing firms have characteristics that relate to competition, product 
differentiation, growth, demand volatility, and risks. These companies may have a framework for the disclosure policy 
differentiated (Dye and Sridhar, 1995). We expect the existence of a relationship between financial disclosure and 
industry 
 
2.1.3. The listing  status 
 
Listing status is a factor explaining the variability of financial disclosure. Companies may have three status, unlisted, 
listed only on the local market or at a single exchange stock market or quoted on several stock market (multiple listing). 
Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that an IPO is an incentive to reduce conflicts between the contracting parties. Firms with 
different status listing levels may disclose information voluntarily because they have different objectives regarding the 
development and growth of capital. Companies with multiple listing are looking to expand their activities abroad (Cooke, 
1991). Multiple listing allows the company to provide an advertisement by the attraction of the press and to satisfy 
information requirements by local users. It also allows access to a financial market more liquid and less segmented than 
its local market.  When company is listed on the international market, there are obligations to disclosure additional 
information than national requirements. This leads us to assume that quality of information disclosed increases when the 
company has a multiple listing. 
 
2.2.  Board of Directors’s Characteristics 
 
According to the agency theory the characteristics of the board can affect the quality and the level of financial information 
disclosed by company. Several theoretical and empirical studies examined this issue such as the studies of Jensen 
(1983); Healy and Palepu (2001); Ho and Wong (2001), Bujaki and McConomy (2002), Clarkson et al, (2003), Barako et 
al. (2006) and Cheung (2010). 
These features concern: 
- The size of the Board; 
- The presence of independent directors; 
- Dual functions of Chief Executive Officer and Chairman of the Board; 
- The attendance of Board members at meetings. 
 
2.2.1. The size of the board 
 
The size of the board is a decreasing function of the effectiveness of control. When adding a new member to the board of 
directors enhances the board's oversight capacity. However, this is offset by implication the marginal cost of an additional 
member in terms of taking control and information disclosure (Jensen, 1993). In this case, the marginal cost increases 
when we add members to the board, by cons, the control and its effectiveness decreases. According to Jensen (1993), 
the boards consist of more than seven or eight directors are more easily controllable by the manager. Campos et al, 
(2002) noted that the size of the board should not be too large or too small and suggested an optimum number is 
between 5 to 9 members. Large boards may contain mechanisms for entrenchment (Yermack, 1996; Godard, 2001). 
Indeed, a large board has a negative impact on its performance. A large board increases problems of communication and 
coordination and also reduces the ability of directors to oversee management.  It causes an increase in manipulation of 
earnings by manager and production information with poor quality. Through these points of view, we expect that there is a 
relationship between the size of the board and the quality of the information disclosed. 
 
2.2.2 The proportion of independent directors 
 
Independent directors can be officers of others companies or representatives of financial institutions. Based on their 
experience, independent directors can contest decisions made by managers and therefore exercise more effective 
control. The independent directors act as a reliable mechanism to reduce agency conflicts between managers and 
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shareholders (Fama and Jensen, 1983). They provide the necessary checks to improve the effectiveness of the Board 
(Franks et al, 2001). These directors assemble the conditions of objectivity and independence. By providing efficient  
control, independent directors seek to improve their reputation in the labor market (Fama, 1980). The relationship 
between the proportion of independent directors on the board and financial disclosure quality within the company was 
provided by Haniffa and Cooke (2002), Chen and Jaggi (2000), Arcay and Vazquez (2005). They found a positive effect 
of the existence of independent directors on the disclosure of financial information. Based on these explanations, our 
hypothesis is as follow: The proportion of independent directors affects positively the quality of financial information 
disclosed. 
 
2.2.3 Separation of function of Chief Executive Officers and Chairman of the Board 
 
According to the agency theory, the combined functions can significantly alter the most important function of the Board 
that is the control, discipline and compensate executives. It also allows to the manager to adopt opportunistic behavior, 
because of its domination of the board. Manager can easily impose investments that he proposes even if these 
investments do not create value for shareholders. According to agency theory the separation of management and control 
decisions reduces agency costs and increase firm performance. A person who combines both functions would tend to 
withhold unfavorable information outside. All negative consequences of duality could be eliminated by market discipline 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983). 
Separation of function is not always adopted by companies. There is many companies are well managed with 
combined functions. In the presence of combination of functions, it will be easier for the CEO to achieve the objectives of 
the company because there will be less interference and therefore contributes to enhancing business leadership and 
guidance (Dahya, Lonie, and Power, 1996). Their arguments are based on the theory of stewardship, which implies that 
managers act in the best interests of the company and shareholders, and as such, the duality can improve the 
effectiveness of the board (Hanifa and Cook, 2002). Empirical studies dealing with the combination of functions gave 
mixed results. Among the studies that are for the separation of functions, among them there are Ho and Wong, (2001), 
Gul and Leung, (2004).  
Through these arguments we can formulate our hypothesis as follows: the relationship between separation of 
function (CEO and Chairman) and the quality of financial information is positive 
 
2.2.4 The frequency of meetings and the attendance of members of the Board of Directors meetings 
 
Meeting frequency can be considered as a measure of the activity of the Board of Directors (Xie et al, 2003). When the 
number of meetings increases, the operating performance of the company is improved (Vafeas, 1999). This suggests that 
the frequency of meetings is an important aspect in the effectiveness of the Board. The board that meets more frequently, 
should be able to devote more time to issues such as performance management and hence to the quality of the 
information. To control the production of information at board meetings and participate in decision making, the attendance 
of members at meetings can be considered as a determinant of the quality of the work of the board (Ben Ayed-Koubaa, 
2010).  Thus, this discussion suggests the following hypothesis: attendance at meetings by the board affects positively 
the quality of financial information disclosed 
 
2.3  Audit quality 
 
Among mechanisms of control adopted by firm to inspect financial information quality there are the external auditor and 
the audit committee.  
 
2.3.1.The external auditor 
 
Audit function has a key role in the control of the management of companies where the owners do not provide 
stewardship. An external audit can significantly influence the amount of information disclosed. This relationship is 
consistent with agency theory; an audit firm with large size has a strong incentive to maintain their independence and to 
impose more stringent disclosure standards because they have more to lose from damage to their reputation. The large 
audit firms invest more to maintain their reputation as providers of effective control that small audit firms (DeAngelo, 
1981). The independence enjoyed by a large company audit allows them to influence corporate financial information 
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disclosed, to satisfy the needs of external users for reports, since their values as auditors depend on the nature of user 
perception of financial information (DeAngelo, 1981).  
Signal theory suggests that the choice of an external auditor can serve as a signal of the value of the company. In 
general, entrepreneurs are likely to choose a large audit firm size (eg, Big 4) because it is a signal to investors. The 
choice of audit firm has been found to be a signal of firm value. The presence of Big4 is considered as a signal quality of 
the disclosure of the company and the integrity of financial information (Datar, Feltham and Hughes, 1991). The agency 
theory suggests that external audit have a role in mitigating the conflict between management and shareholders (Xiao et 
al, 2004, Jensen and Meckling 1976). This suggests that firms with higher agency costs will be more inclined to obtain 
higher quality audits by contacting large audit firms. Studies of Xiao Yang and Chow (2004), Leung et al, (2005) and 
Wang et al, (2008)   found a relationship between the size of audit firm and the disclosure quality of financial information 
by companies. Through these arguments, we expect a positive relationship between the quality of financial disclosed and 
the presence of a Big 4. 
 
2.3.2. The presence of audit committee 
 
The Board of Directors may delegate certain functions to specialized committees such as the audit committee. The 
function of an audit committee, ensure the quality of financial accounting and control system. The agency theory suggests 
for the establishment of audit committees to reduce agency costs. The presence of an audit committee is associated with 
reliable financial information. It reduces the impact of errors and irregularities (McMullen, 1996). The Board of directors 
delegates responsibility to the audit committee to enhance the relevance and reliability of financial information disclosed. 
Thus, audit committees can be considered as a monitoring mechanism that improves the quality of information flow 
between shareholders and managers, especially in the financial information environment, where the level of information 
detained by users is heterogeneous. From these explanations, we expect a positive relationship between the presence of 
an audit committee and the quality of information disclosed 
 
2.4  The ownership structure 
 
Among aspects of ownership structures there are concentration of ownership and institutional ownership        
 
2.4.1.   The percentage held by major shareholders  
 
The agency theory suggests that in a modern society, due to the separation of ownership and control, there is a 
possibility of agency conflicts (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This conflict may be more important when shares are widely 
distributed than when they are held by one person (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Managers can therefore voluntarily disclose 
information as a means to reduce agency conflicts with the shareholders. The concentration of capital can be considered 
as an assurance of effectiveness monitoring the labor of managers by shareholders (Denis et al., 1997). Major 
shareholders have the possibility to monitor easily managers in order to protect their investment, as opposed to minority 
shareholders who have limited financial resources. When capital is concentrated, major shareholders may pose a threat 
of expropriation for minority and they are therefore predisposed to disclosure financial information. Indeed, a good 
disclosure can protect minority shareholders. The major shareholders have a strong interest in the performance of the 
firm and therefore increase the capacity of voluntary disclosure. As Barako et al (2006) Li et Qi (2008), we predict that 
there is a relationship between the concentration of capital and the quality and level of disclosure. 
 
2.4.2. The percentage of shares held by institutional shareholders 
 
Institutional investors collect large amounts from the public and invest in the capital of large corporations. Vast 
importance is given to these investors. They are more severe in terms of regular financial information and published in a 
timely manner (Healy et al, 1999). Their property in the capital of a company can reduce agency costs. Where such 
participation is important, institutional investors may force managers to improve the quality of published information. The 
presence of institutional investors can be seen as a governance mechanism. Indeed, because of the large amounts 
invested in the company, institutional investors have the motivation to intervene very active in the management of the firm 
and may also have the motivation to monitor managers (Jensen, 1993). In this context, we can predict that the presence 
of institutional investors has a positive effect on the quality and level of disclosure; 
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3. The presentation of data and variables 
 
3.1. The presentation of data 
 
In order to test the relationship between the mechanisms of governance and the quality of information, we have selected 
a sample of French listed companies in the SBF 250 index. The study period is from 2004 until 2008. To ensure 
consistency of the sample, financial institutions (banks and insurance companies) were excluded because they are 
subject to specific regulations concerning publication. We eliminated firms with missing data (financial and governance 
data). In the end, the sample is composed by 101 companies. For accounting and financial data we have obtained from 
the Worldscope database. The data concerning the mechanisms of governance collected manually from annual reports. 
 
Table 1. Methodology of sample selection 
 
 Number of firms 
Companies listed on the SBF 250 250 
Financial institutions (banks and insurance) 46 
Missing reports for the entire period 35 
Unlisted companies across the period 14 
Missing data 55 
Sample 101 
 
Companies components our samples are divided into three sectors. The table below shows the number of firms by 
sector: 
 
Table2. The distribution of firms by industy 
 
Industry Number of companies pourcentage 
Manufactoring 55 54.46% 
Services 23 22.77% 
Communication 23 22.77% 
 
3.2. Presentation of variables 
 
3.2.1. Quality of Financial Information  
 
The dependent variable in this empirical study is the quality of financial information disclosed. This variable has 
approximated by the disclosure index and the discretionary accruals: 
For the construction of the disclosure index unweighted, we consulted the following documents: 
- Previous empirical studies that aims to identify best practices of disclosure of financial information whose main 
support is the annual report (Haniffa et Cook, 2002; Collet and Hrasky, 2005;  Hassan et al, 2006;  Bangh and 
Plenborg, 2008).  
- Some annual reports of listed companies; 
- French financial market authority recommendations on financial information disclosed of listed companies.  
The items selected should have certain characteristics in order to eliminate those that may skew the understanding 
of extent disclosure practices of companies. In fact, the items must generally be disclosed by all firms. It should not be 
very specific for one activity. The information published in our index should have importance of the perspective of any 
user. Our disclosure index include voluntarily and mandatory information. This choice helps to increase the number of 
items inserted. Our aim is to construct an index that measures the level and quality of disclosure.  At the international 
level, there are studies that used only the mandatory information; there are also those who have opted for information 
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disclosed only on a voluntary basis. The score may be an indicator of quality. The items selected must complete the main 
characteristics of financial information disclosed: relevance, reliability, understandability. 
Taking into account its criteria we grouped the items into six categories to reach 78 items: 
 
Table3.: Distribution of items by category of information 
 
Category of items  number of items 
A-General Information and Strategic 13 
B-Information on the financial statements 12 
C-The Social and environmental data 6 
D-The Corporate Governance 18 
E-Market and financial information 18 
F- Forecast information 4 
G- Other information  7 
TOTAL 78 
 
The extent of disclosure index is calculated as follows: 
 ¦
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UI: unweighted index 
D: items of information disclosed by the company 
m: is the maximum number of items that the Company may disclose 
 
The discretionary accruals.  
 
The second measure of financial information quality is the discretionary accruals. For Francis et al, (2005) discretionary 
accruals is considered as an indicator of the quality of financial information disclosed. For this study the discretionary 
accruals estimated by the model of Shahrur and Raman (2008). This is the model of Kothari et al, (2005) extended by 
book-to-market 
For this model the total accruals are calculated as follows: 
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We calculated the total accruals as the difference between net income and operating cash flow. 
 ܰܣ௜௧ ൌ ߙොଵ ͳܣݏݏ݁ݐ௜௧ିଵ ൅ ߙොଶ itSALES∆ܣݏݏ݁ݐ௜௧ିଵ ൅ ߙොଷ ܲܲܧ௜௧ܣݏݏ݁ݐ௜௧ିଵ ൅ ߙොସܴܱܣ௜௧ ൅ ߙොହܤܯ௜௧  
(3) 
 
The discretionary accruals (DACC) in year t are calculated as the difference between total accruals and normal 
accruals (NA) as follows: 
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ܦܣܥܥ௜ǡ௧ ൌ ܶܣ௜ǡ௧ܣݏݏ݁ݐ௜ǡ௧ିଵ െ ܰܣ௜ǡ௧ 
(4) 
 
Avec  ܶܣܥ௜௧ǣTotal accruals; ܣܵܵܧܶ ௜ܵǡ௧ିଵǣTotal assets of firm ( i ) at period t-1; οܵܣܮܧ ௜ܵǡ௧ǣVariation in sales of firm ( i )  at the period t ܲܲܧ௜ǡ௧ǣ Property, Plant and Equipment of firm ( i )  at the period t;  ܴܱܣ௜ǡ௧ǣ  Return on assets of firm ( i )  at the period t;  ܤܯ௜ǡ௧ǣ Book to market of firm ( i )  at period t. 
 
3.2.2. Explanatory variable 
 
We try to explain the quality of the financial information based on several variables mentioned throughout the literature. 
These variables are related to the characteristics of the company, and on the internal mechanism of governance. 
We approximated leverage by the ratio (total debt / total assets), among the authors who have used this measure, 
we can mention Khanna, Palepu and Srinivasan (2004), Leventis and Weetman (2004), Barako et al, (2006), Hassan, 
Giorgioni and Romilly (2006), Aksu and Kosedag (2006), Zeghal et al, (2006), Lu, Liao and Yang (2007), Agca and Onder 
(2007 ), Ho and Taylor (2007) and Jiang et al. (2008). 
We approximated Profitability by the market by Tobin's Q as the studies of Khanna, Palepu and Srinivasan (2004) 
Cheung et al, (2006);  Lu, Liao and Yang (2007).  
Tobin's Q = (market capitalization + market value of debt) /Replacement cost of assets 
We approximated status listing by a binary variable. We give the value 1 if the firm has a dual listing and 0 
otherwise. Several researchers used this variable such as Cooke ( 1989), Wallace et al, (1994), Inchausti (1997), 
Leventis and Weetman (2004), Prencipe (2004),  Arcay and Vazquez (2005), Leung et al. (2005)  
We divided sample into three industries (manufacturing, services and communication). On our model, we have 
three binary variables. Assigned the value 1 if the firm (i) belongs to sector (j), and 0 otherwise. We seek any sector 
discloses more financial information (Cooke, 1989;  Raffournier, 1995; Archambault and Archambault, 2003; Hanifa and 
Rashid, 2005;  Akhtaruddin, 2005;  Hassan, Giorgioni and Romilly, 2006 and Jiang et al, 2008). 
For the Board of Directors, it is represented by several variables: 
The size of the board is approximated by the number of directors on the board, Godard (2001) and Fernández and 
Arrondo (2005) and Zeghal et al, (2006). 
The attendance of members at meetings as measured by percentage of attendance of members at meetings 
(Vafeas, 1999;  Xie et al, 2003 and  Ben Ayed-Koubaa, 2010). 
The presence of independent directors as measured by the proportion of independent outside directors on the 
board (Arrondo and Fernández, 2005; Barako et al, 2006 and Zeghal et al, 2006) 
The duality function of CEO and chairman is measured by a binary variable that takes the value 1 in the presence 
of dual function and 0 otherwise. Several previous researches opted for this measure, such as Brickley et al. (1997), 
Godard and Schatt (2000) Chtourou et al, (2001) and Zeghal et al, (2006). 
Audit quality approximated by two variables: The presence of the audit committee measured by a binary variable, 
assigned 1 when companies have an audit committee and 0 otherwise.  
The size of audit firm approximated as follow: Assigned the number 1 if the firm is audited by one auditor belonging 
to the big 4 and 0 otherwise. 
Ownership structure represented by the ownership concentration measured by the percentage owned by the major 
shareholder, this measure is also used by Godard (2001) and Fernández and Arrondo (2005) and Zeghal et al, (2006). 
The presence of institutional investors is measured by a binary variable. Assigned the value 1if institutional investors 
have more than 5% of capital and 0 otherwise. 
 
 
 
 
 
ISSN 2039-2117 (online) 
ISSN 2039-9340 (print) 
       Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences 
            Published by MCSER-CEMAS-Sapienza University of Rome 
Vol 4 No 2 
May 2013 
 
 327 
4. Analysis and interpretation of results 
 
At the analysis result we will proceed with the analysis of the variables used in our model by the descriptive analysis, the 
determination of the bivariate correlation and multivariate between the explanatory variables finally we will make an 
estimate based on the regression in Panel data. 
 
4.1.  The descriptive analysis 
 
4.1.1. The descriptive statistics 
 
Descriptive statistics of dependent and independent variables are shown in Table 3. 
From the descriptive statistics we observe that on average, Tobin’s Q is greater than 1. It demonstrates the 
presence of important performance related to market for French companies and growth opportunities. 64% of the sample 
has a dual structure; attendance at meetings of the board of directors is on average 86%. The board met on average 6 
times per year (6.68). On average, boards are large, the average size is 10, it is a value greater than the optimum set by 
Jensen (1993) that is 9 members. According to this author a board composed of more than seven or eight directors is 
more easily controllable by the manager. Campos et al (2002) noted that the size of the board should not be too large or 
too small and suggested an optimum number is between 5 to 9 members. The half of the members of the Board is 
independent (43.83%). Among 69% of companies have officers whose exercise both the functions of CEO and chairman 
of the board. And 80% of companies have an audit committee. 
 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics of variables 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std, Dev, Min Max 
DI 505 0,7991594 0,0702844 0,5896 0,9231 
DACC 505 -0,0273578 0,1123514 -1,658396 0,6701526 
LEV 505 0,2438619 0,1486237 0 0,7568396 
PRO 505 1,342008 1,914398 0,2142435 36,3984 
NB 505 9,962376 3,83289 3 21 
IND 505 0,4383567 0,1981265 0 1 
DUA 505 0,6891089 0,4633173 0 1 
INST 505 0,4772277 0,4999764 0 1 
OWN 505 0,3328322 0,2108464 0,02 0,9168 
Number of meeting 505 6,685149 2,950295 2 30 
MA 505 0,8591924 0,0861177 0,5 1 
AC 505 0,7980198 0,4018756 0 1 
BIG4 505 1,281188 0,657785 0 2 
MAN 505 0,5247525 0,4998821 0 1 
SERV 505 0,2277228 0,4197786 0 1 
COM 505 0,2376238 0,4260495 0 1 
 
DI: disclosure Index; DACC: discretionary accruals; Lev : leverage PRO: The Profitability (Qtobin) ; NB: numbers of 
members in board ; IND independent directors (members extern / total members in board); MA:  percentage of 
attendance of members at meetings ; DUA duality of function for manager; INST The institutional investors ; OWN : the 
percentage owned by the majority shareholder ; AC: Audit Committee; BIG4 presence of an auditor belonging to BIG4; 
ML: multiple listing;  MAN, SERV and  COM designed respectively manufacturing , service and communication industry. 
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4.1.2. The bivariate and multivariate correlation 
 
The correlation between two variables is detected by the Pearson correlation matrix. The bivariate test shows the 
presence of a low correlation between explanatory variable. The correlation not exceeds 30%. 
To assess multicollinearity, the regression should be performed with each exogenous with other variables and 
examine the coefficient of determination associated. Indicators of multivariate correlation, we have: Factor variance 
inflation (VIF) and tolerance. 
There is a problem when the coefficient of collinearity (VIF) greater than 4. Some authors use less restrictive 
thresholds ie 5 or even 10. The objective of this analysis is to identify the variables that cause the most problems in the 
regression. 
The result of the tests shows absence of multicollinearity between explanatory variables. All VIF values are 
identified below the treeline fixed by Groebner et al., (2005), that is 5. 
 
Table4. Pearson correlation matrix 
 
LEV PRO NB IND DUA INST OWN MA AC BIG4 ML VIF 
LEV 1.00 
       
 
 
 
 
1.22 
PRO -0.212 1.000   1.12 
NB 0.122 -0.193 1.000   1.79 
IND 0.104 -0.118 0.168 1.000   1.57 
DUA -0.035 0.048 -0.062 -0.184 1.000   1.17 
INST 0.045 -0.056 0.269 0.213 0.016 1.000   1.20 
OWN -0.088 0.014 -0.214 -0.299 0.059 -0.115 1.000   1.31 
MA 0.086 -0.017 0.045 0.159 -0.13 0.176 0.002 1.000   1.40 
AC -0.114 -0.009 0.173 0.207 -0.03 0.165 0.030 0.128 1.000  1.47 
BIG4 -0.067 -0.093 0.286 0.166 -0.04 0.122 -0.069 0.1655 0.170 1.000  1.32 
ML 0.101 0.062 0.110 0.178 -0.05 -0.056 -0.185 -0.011 -0.04 0.099 1.000 1.13 
   
4.2.   The multivariate analysis 
 
Concerning the disclosure index, we opted for the use of quartiles to split the sample between companies providing 
good information quality and companies with low disclosure quality. We obtain transparent and opaque firm. We used the 
second quartile (Q2 = 50%), companies whose score is lower than the calculated second quartile that is 0.8076 are 
considered as companies offering poor quality information and opaque. Against those with a value for the index above 
0.8076 are considered as transparent and disclose information with high quality. 
The dependent variable in this case becomes: 
Disclosure Quality = 0 if the index is lower than 0.8076 
                             = 1 if not 
The binary nature of variable and the study focuses on 101 companies over five years leads us to use the panel 
logit model. Whose distribution function is represented as follows: 
 ݈݋݃ ൬ ݌ͳ െ ݌൰ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅෍ߚ௜ݔ௜ǡ௧௡௜ୀଵ  
(5) 
 
To detect the relationship between the quality of financial information disclosed and its determinants specifically 
those relating to corporate governance, we use many variables related to governance.  Four variables describing the 
characteristics of the board (board size, presence of independent director, the combination of functions and attendance at 
meetings), two variables on the ownership structure (percentage held by institutional investors and percentage held by 
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the major  shareholder) and finally two variables measuring the quality control (presence of the Audit Committee and 
audit firm size). 
Since we have two measures for the quality of financial information that is the extent of disclosure index and the 
discretionary accruals (Shahrur and Raman, 2008) this step allows us to have the two equations below: 
 
Equation 1 : 
 
DACCi,t = ȕ0+ȕ1  LEVi,t+ ȕ2  PROi,t+ ȕ3 NBi,t+ ȕ4 INDi,t+ ȕ5MAi,t + ȕ 6  DUAi,t + ȕ7 INSTii,t 
+ȕ8OWNi,t+ȕ9ACi,t+ȕ10BIG4i,t+ȕ11MLi,t+ȕ12MANi,t+İi,t                                    
(6) 
Equation 2 : 
 
DQi,t = ȕ0+ȕ1  LEVi,t+ ȕ2  PROi,t+ ȕ3 NBi,t+ ȕ4 INDi,t+ ȕ5MAi,t + ȕ 6  DUAi,t + ȕ7 INSTii,t + 
ȕ8OWNi,t+ȕ9ACi,t+ȕ10BIG4i,t+ȕ11MLi,t+ȕ12MANi,t+İi,                                        
(7) 
DQ: disclosure quality;  
DACC: discretionary accruals;  
Lev : leverage;  
PRO:  The Profitability (Qtobin) ; 
NB: numbers of members in the board of directors; 
IND: independent directors (members extern / total members in board); 
MA:  percentage of attendance of members at meetings;  
DUA: duality of function for manager;  
INST: The institutional investors;   
OWN : the percentage owned by the majority shareholder ;  
AC: Audit Committee;  
BIG4: presence of an auditor belonging to BIG4;  
ML: Multiple listing;  
MAN:  manufacturing industry.                
 
For the model where quality information is approximated by discretionary accruals, we found that the quality of 
information is better for a company with a higher performance. There is a negative relationship between discretionary 
accruals and Tobin's Q. The same result is obtained by Becker et al, (1998).  In fact, a profitable firm has growth 
opportunities, it may disclose more information to indicate the credibility of its reported earnings and the projects that it 
expects to achieve. This will increase its reputation and avoid under-evaluation of its actions. This relationship can also 
be explained also by the behavior of managers. These provide more information to illustrate their ability to maximize 
value for shareholders and at the same time increase their compensation. 
Variable on the multiple listing has a positive coefficient and it is significant at the 1% level. Indeed in the presence 
of a foreign listing, the company seeks to follow the international standards where there are more requirements in term of 
disclosure and quality of information. 
With dual listing the company may have an advertisement by the attraction of the press and the satisfaction of 
information needs of local users. It also allows to the company to access to more liquid financial markets than its 
domestic market. Our results are similar to those found by Cooke (1989), Wallace et al, (1994), Inchausti (1997), Leventis 
and Weetman (2004), Prencipe (2004) and Gray and Leung (2005).  
 
Table 5. The estimation results of the determinants of the quality of financial disclosure 
 
 Equation 1 Equation 2 
Variables coefficient t-statistics coefficient t-statistics 
LEV -.0105306 -0.85 -5.804071 -1.14 
PRO -.0125385*** -4.32 -.2272125 -1.14 
NB -.0014263*** -2.92 -.3518097 -1.39 
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IND -.0082159 -0.86 -0.9305052 -0.29 
MA -.046118** -2.23 19.35026*** 2.89 
DUA -.0051072 -1.33 -7.974536 *** -4.37 
INST 0.0078676** 2.03 -1.142322 -0.71 
OWN .0115638 1.26 -5.535982 -1.31 
AC -.0020915 -0.51 3.172463 1.24 
BIG4 -.0071458** -2.40 1.703402 1.36 
ML -0.123979*** -3.49 10.43558*** 5.43 
MAN .0123979*** 3.07 3.136482* 1.80 
Constante .0569653*** 2.60 -14.8693 *** -2.06 
Wald chi2(13) 74.11***  58.19***  
(*), (**) and (***) respectively significant at a level of 10%, 5% and 1%. 
 
For governance variables, we found that the quality of financial information is important for a company follows by 
an auditors belonging to the big 4. Unlike Janin and Piot (2008) did not detect relationship between the size of audit firm 
and earning management. The existence of large audit firm improves the efficiency of the control system and can 
encourage managers to disclosure more information and give a more credibility. According to the literature the 
independence, expertise, reputation and the size of audit firm can be considered as barriers to the earning management 
and the information published may be better(Xie et al, 2003,  Cormier and Martinez, 2006, and Carcello et al, 2006). 
The attendance of Board members at meetings has a negative effect on earning management. This relationship is 
represented by a negative and significant coefficient at the 5% threshold and therefore there is an impact positive on the 
quality of information disclosed by the French listed companies. Indeed, members can attend to exercise some control 
and helps in decision making at meetings and production of data. 
The size of the board has an impact on the quality of the information measured by discretionary accruals. This is 
shown by the presence of a significant relationship at the 1% level. This result demonstrates that the earning 
management increases when the board is composed by small number of directors. This result is contrary to that found by 
Kao and Chen (2004), Bita and Majella (2008) and similar to those of Xie et al, (2003) and Bradbury et al, (2004). Firth et 
al (2007) for a sample of Chinese firms, based on data from 1998 to 2003, not found a significant relationship between 
the size of the board and the quality of financial information approximated by discretionary accruals . 
Large Board are more effective than small board since it contains more experienced directors, and play an 
important role in limiting earnings management (Xie et al, 2003). There is a positive relationship between the size of the 
board of directors and the quality of accounting information and therefore a lower level of discretionary accruals 
(Bradbury et al, 2004). 
As for the variable on the presence of institutional investors, we found a positive relationship and significant at the 
1% level with discretionary accruals.  This variable has an unexpected sign. This result is similar to study of Cornett et al. 
(2007). Institutional shareholder can increase the pressure felt by the manager to meet earnings forecasts causing it to 
engage in earnings management. The effectiveness of the presence of institutional investors depends on the size of their 
shareholdings in the firm. These investors will have no incentive to monitor managers when their share of capital is low 
(Lang and McNichols, 1999). On the other hand, Chau and Gray (2002) argue that when the ownership structure is 
concentrated, large institutional investors are not concerned about the voluntary disclosure, since they have access to 
information in the firm. 
Regarding industry, we found that firms in manufacturing industry do not provide enough quality information.  
We found among the variables not significant, leverage, combining the functions of CEO and chairman of the 
board of directors and ownership concentration, the presence of the Audit Committee and the existence of independent 
directors. This result is similar to those of Bédard et al., (2001); Park and Shin (2004).  
Concerning the inclusion of the second quartile as a measure of the quality of financial information disclosed, we 
found the attendance of members at meetings of the Board, the duality of functions and the presence of dual listing are 
significant at a level of 1%. All signs are expected. The variable concerning duality of function acts negatively on the 
quality of financial information disclosed. According to the agency theory the separation of management and control 
decisions reduces agency costs and increase company performance. Our results are similar to those of Beasley (1996), 
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Ho and Wong (2001), Chtourou, Bedard and Courteau (2001), Gul and Leung (2004). The separation of function 
increases the effectiveness of the Board and improves the quality and level of information disclosed by companies. The 
result for the activity sector shows that firms in the manufacturing industry communicate more financial information. This 
result is significant at the 10% level. This result is contrary to that found for the first measure of the quality of the 
information disclosed. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
In this study we tried to find factors that can influence the quality of financial information approximated by two variables, 
the disclosure index and discretionary accruals. The factors are firm-specific characteristics and those related to 
corporate governance. Our results show that the size of the Board, attendance of members at meetings of the Board,  the 
presence of the auditors belonging to the big 4 and the presence of a double listing have a positive impact on the quality 
of information financial disclosed. By against, the presence of institutional investors gives contrary results. This last result 
is defended by Paquerot (1997) and Lang and McNichols (1999), Chau and Gray (2002). 
One potential limitation of studies is the use of disclosure index as a measure of the quality of disclosure. The 
issue of subjectivity of disclosure index has a significant impact on the development of generalized measures of 
disclosure level. Many problems may exist due to the self-construction of index (Healy and Palepu, 2001). 
In our study, the annual report is used as a support for the construction of the disclosure index. The Company has 
other means of communication of information which may be taken into account such as the media or the internet. Using 
annual report may limit somewhat the scope of disclosure of corporate financial information.  
Further research may take a number of directions. Disclosure policies of listed companies have generally changed 
after the adaptation of international accounting standards (IAS / IFRS) on 2005. Henceforth, it is useful to extend this 
study by taking into account the effect of international standards adopted on the disclosure level by French companies. 
Similarly, the introduction of new laws as Saranes-Oxley Act may encourage companies to disclose more 
information. The study of the impact of these laws is also interesting. The study of the importance of intangible 
information and that relating to social responsibility for companies can be the subject of future research. Similarly, the 
publication of information through web sites is an important support for business. As future research can focus on the 
information and the integration of various communication media and not be limited only to annual reports. Use also the 
technique of event studies may even indicate the effect of the information disclosed. 
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Appendix : List of item for disclosure index 
 
A-General Information and Strategic 
1 - Name of company 
2 - Legal status of the company 
3 - Purpose 
4 - The activity of the companies that it controls 
5 - Word from the CEO 
6 - A brief history of the company 
7 - Description of business activity 
8 - Information about the different types of products. 
9 - Overview of main subsidiaries 
10-Information on the events affecting operations 
11 - information on the industry 
12 - general information about the economic environment 
13 - the organizational structure 
Information on financial statements 
1-The accounting policies 
2 - The date of the financial statements and the period covered by the financial statements 
3-The comparative financial statements. (Company and consolidated) 
4-Changes in the methods of preparation and presentation of financial statements 
5-The equity or dispositions 
6-The statement of changes in equity 
7-Information on income (local, export) 
8-Operating income (evolution, distribution) 
9-expenses and depreciation method 
10-investments (tangible and intangible) 
11-The evolution of turnovers (development, graphic and comments) 
12-The evolution of net income (graphics and comment) 
The Social and environmental data 
1-The number of employees 
2-categories and distribution of employees 
3-organization of working time (duration of working time, absenteeism, etc.) 
4-Information on the training and development resources 
The 5-hygiene and safety work 
6 - Data on environmental protection 
Corporate Governance 
1-The list of members of the Board of Directors 
2-Personal characteristics of Directors 
3-position or function exercised by the directors 
4-The rules governing the appointment and replacement of members 
5-Reminder Governance Code 
6 - position of director mandates 
7 - the number of shares held by directors and executive 
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8-The shareholders 
9-The composition of the shareholding. 
10-The auditor (situations mandates, fees, etc. ..) 
11-employee participation in capital 
12- The presence of committees (audit, remuneration, nomination etc. ..) 
13-List of directors 
14- the members of the Executive 
15-operation of the Executive 
16 - Compensation of Directors and Executive Board 
17-the stock option plan (directors, employees, directors) 
18-conflicts of interest between the Board and the Executive 
Financial and market information 
1-The number of shares and the par value per share 
2 - The market value of shares 
3-The market value of equity investments 
4-Information on the share capital and voting rights 
5-The evolution of stock prices and transactions (trading volume) 
6-The market capitalization at year-end, trend 
7-The dividend policy of the company 
8-The dividends paid for the last three years (evolution) 
9TheDividends per share. 
10-Earnings per share 
11-The evolution of capital (nature of the transaction, the outstanding capital) 
12-The information on new issues 
13-The evolution of the financial structure (Working Capital Fund) 
14-The liquidity ratio 
15-The debt ratio 
16-The solvency ratio 
17-The price / earnings ratio (PER) 
18-profitability ratios (ROA, ROE) 
Looking information 
1-Information on future 
2-Discuss the main factors influencing the next fiscal year 
3-The earnings estimates for 3 years 
4-Projections of future cash flows for 3 years 
Other information  
1-The report of the Board of Directors. 
2-The report of the auditor 
3-The resolutions dd / mm / yyyy 
4-The activity indicators 
5-The elements of internal control, 
6- Risk management policy 
7-activities in research and development 
